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Cognitive engineering is the application of cognitive psychology and related disciplines to the design 
and operation of human-machine systems. Cognitive engineering combines both detailed and close 
study of the human worker in the actual work context and the study of the worker in more 
controlled environments. Cognitive engineering combines multiple methods and perspectives to 
achieve the goal of improved system performance. Given the origins of experimental psychology 
itself in issues regarding the design of human-machine systems, cognitive engineering is a core, or 
fundamental, discipline within academic psychology. 
 Cognitive Engineering is an applied cognitive science, or as Woods and Roth state Cognitive 
EŶgiŶeeƌiŶg, ͞is aŶ applied cognitive science that draws on the knowledge and techniques of 
cognitive psychology and related disciplines to provide the foundation for principle-driven design of 
person-ŵaĐhiŶe sǇsteŵs͟ ;‘ef ϭ, p. ϰϭϱͿ. The foĐus is oŶ the appliĐatioŶ of ĐogŶitive psychology to 
the design and construction of machines or human-machine systems.2 While often described as the 
application of cognitive psychology in particular, most researchers in the field of Cognitive 
Engineering take an eclectic or ecumenical approach, borrowing from other disciplines as necessary, 
for example, anthropology and sociology. This interdisciplinary orientation enriches the methods 
available to cognitive engineers. Cognitive psychology, or applied experimental psychology, has 
strengths in the quantification of behaviour and experimental methods, but these can be 
supplemented with the qualitative and field methods developed by anthropologists and 
sociologists.3  
 Cognitive Engineering is also best regarded as a goal-directed activity. As Norman relates, 
͞the goal of CogŶitiǀe EŶgiŶeeƌiŶg is to Đoŵe to uŶdeƌstaŶd the issues, to shoǁ hoǁ to ŵake ďetteƌ 
choices when they exist, and to show what the tradeoffs are when, as is the usual case, an 
improvement in one domain leads to deficits in anotheƌ͟ ;‘ef Ϯ, p. ϯϭͿ. To aĐĐoŵplish this goal, 
cognitive engineers must first understand the human-machine system. This entails the need to 
become familiar with the specific work setting being examined, whether this is air-traffic control, 
battlefield management, medical monitoring, or, in historical settings, astronomical observation. The 
formal method of becoming familiar with the particular human-machine system often adapts the 
field methodology more familiar to anthropologists and sociologists than to experimental 
psychologists.3 Indeed, the introduction of these field methods and a clear statement of the need to 
become highly familiar with the particulars of the human-machine work system is a marker of the 
new approach to cognitive engineering, which emerged in the late 20th century. Once the human-
machine system is understood, improvements can be suggested using general principles of human 
cognition informed by domain-specific knowledge. These suggestions for system improvements are 
then subjected to rigorous tests to determine their efficacy, including their robustness in operational 
or close-to-operational (simulated) settings.  
  An outstanding issue is the relationship between Cognitive Engineering and Human Factors 
or Engineering Psychology. The latter two are terms that describe the application of human science 
and psychology to human-machine system design with the intent of improving system performance. 
However, while some advocates of Cognitive Engineering see the field as simply another dimension 
of the field of applied psychology or Human Factors (essentially Cognitive Engineering is completely 
continuous with psychology and Human Factors as a whole), another group see Cognitive 
Engineering as new and revolutionary. Although the former perspective is probably more historically 
accurate (as we outline in the next section of this review), the advocates of the new Cognitive 
Engineering have undoubtedly added important dimensions to the discipline and thereby expanded 
its scope. Nevertheless, the move towards the new Cognitive Engineering may have overlooked the 
field͛s histoƌiĐal legaĐǇ aŶd ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg tƌaditioŶ iŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal laďoƌatoƌǇ ƌeseaƌĐh. As ǁe ǁill 
conclude, we suspect that Cognitive Engineering is simply a facet of Human Factors and fits 
comfortably within that discipline.  
Although Cognitive Engineering might be regarded as a facet of Human Factors, one advantage 
of the introduction of the term is that it may have merits for rebranding Human Factors and 
cognitive psychology more broadly.4  Indeed, adding the term engineering may have increased the 
professional recognition of Human Factors and cognitive psychology. This may add weight to the 
discipline, since engineering engenders a level of usefulness, practicality, and effectiveness. In the 
following review, we will provide a historical perspective on Cognitive Engineering, relay some of the 
contributions of the new approach to cognitive engineering, and the contributions of earlier 
approaches to cognitive engineering. Finally, we will conclude that Cognitive Engineering and, by 
extension, its capacity to effect improvements in the industrial landscape, is best achieved through a 
combination of both laboratory and field work.   
 
PSYCHOLOGY HAS ALWAYS BEEN COGNITIVE ENGINEERING  
Cognitive Engineering is not, despite pretensions,1 an entirely novel idea and might be 
considered a natural aspect or facet of academic psychology. Indeed, much of psychology itself could 
be considered some form of cognitive engineering. Contemporary psychological text books, when 
presenting the history of psychology, often obscure its technological origins such that psychology 
appears less applied than it is in reality.5 This was not the case in earlier psychology textbooks,6 
where the practical and applied origin of psychology was considerably more explicit. Academic 
psychology directly originated in a practical concern with optical technology: the personal equation 
in astronomy.  
In the early nineteenth century, there was wide-spread recognition that astronomers differed 
in the times that they recorded transits. A transit in astronomy is when a celestial body crosses in 
front of a marker in either the eye-piece of a telescope or another celestial object. The individual 
differences in transit times were sufficient to have significant implications for important calculations 
needed for both navigation and geodesy. This would have wider societal implications for commerce 
and military operations, which were dependent on accurate geo-location. Wilhelm Wundt, 
Franciscus Donders, and the other founders of academic psychology were addressing the personal 
equation in their research.7  
Until the introduction of photographic measurement methods in the late 19th century, which 
made earlier transit techniques obsolete, astronomers themselves were deeply concerned with the 
personal equation.8 The chronoscope invented by Charles Wheatstone in the UK in the 1840s and 
the chronograph, developed by researchers in the United States, were developed to measure 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ ƌeaĐtioŶ tiŵes aĐĐuƌately and these technologies were quickly deployed to address the 
personal equation in astronomical observatories. Ormsby Mitchel, director of the Cincinnati College 
(now University of Cincinnati) Mt. Adams observatory, revolutionized the field by employing a 
galvanic barrel chronograph in astronomy. In 1851, with the help of colleagues such as Harvard 
astronomer Benjamin Peirce, Mitchel demonstrated to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science the level of precision that could be achieved by measuring and taking 
account of what Mitchel called the personality of the eye.9 IŶspiƌed ďǇ MitĐhel͛s pioŶeeƌiŶg ǁoƌk, 
George Airy10 at the Greenwich observatory developed a series of transit studies using an artificial 
star. Airy would use this simulated task to ŵeasuƌe aŶ astƌoŶoŵeƌ͛s peƌsoŶal eƋuatioŶ oƌ 
personality of the eye.  
Observatories in the mid 19th century were comparatively well funded research organizations 
doing work important for society. The Greenwich observatory, for example, had a staff of 53 
employees, including assistants and people hired to make computations (computers). The cognitive 
engineering undertaken by Airy and his contemporaries to more precisely control and improve 
observatory work revolutionized astronomical work and, as Schaffer8 argues, resulted in the 
industrialization of the observatory. Indeed, this work industrialized science itself. As Mitchel (Ref 
ϭϭ, p. ϭϳϲͿ ǁƌote, ͞the oďseƌǀeƌ hiŵself is ďut aŶ iŵpeƌfeĐt aŶd ǀaƌiaďle ŵaĐhiŶe, utteƌlǇ iŶĐapaďle 
of marking the exact ŵoŵeŶts ƌeƋuiƌed.͟ BǇ studǇiŶg the sĐieŶtist, the sĐieŶtist͛s ĐogŶitiǀe sǇsteŵ, 
aŶd iŶĐludiŶg this iŶfoƌŵatioŶ iŶ the sǇsteŵ͛s desigŶ, the eŶtiƌe oďseƌǀatoƌǇ sǇsteŵ Đould ďe 
improved as a functional whole. The pioneers of psychology were cognitive engineers.   
  In pursuing the personal equation, Wundt was effectively undertaking a process analogous 
to contemporary approaches to cognitive engineering. He required highly trained participants for his 
perceptual research because this reflected the reality of workers in contemporary observatories. 
BoƌiŶg ƌepoƌts iŶ ƌelatioŶ to WuŶdt͛s ƌeseaƌĐh that, ͞No oďseƌǀeƌ ǁho had peƌfoƌŵed less thaŶ 
10,000 of these introspectively controlled reactions was suitable to provide data for published 
ƌeseaƌĐh fƌoŵ WuŶdt͛s laďoƌatoƌǇ͟ ;‘ef ϭϮ, p.ϭϳϮͿ. Therefore, the origins of psychology as an 
academic field were a direct result of these early forays into what might be regarded as cognitive 
engineering. The astronomers of the time were highly trained and calibrated using for example, 
MitĐhel͛s aŶd AiƌǇ͛s teĐhŶiƋues. WuŶdt͛s eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe tƌeated siŵilaƌlǇ, as theǇ 
were replicates of their working models. Despite rumours to the contrary, the main thrust of 
WuŶdt͛s laďoƌatoƌǇ ǁoƌk ǁas eĐologiĐallǇ ƌealistiĐ aŶd ƌeflected the working conditions of his 
intended audience.  
 In addition to the issue of the personal equation, other research topics explored by early 
academic psychologists also came directly from human-machine systems. These included the issue 
of range estimation. The rifled barrel was introduced to artillery in the 1840s. Rifling, which results in 
spinning the projectile, dramatically increased the range and accuracy of artillery fire. However, the 
benefits of rifling could only be realized if the gunner could accurately estimate the distance to the 
target. Herman von Helmholtz developed the first optical range finder, which used perceptual 
research to improve range estimation. Charles Wheatstone, inventor of the stereoscope and 
chronoscope, also explored optical issues regarding distance estimation, and also worked for the 
Bƌitish adŵiƌaltǇ to iŵpƌoǀe guŶŶeƌs͛ ƌate of fiƌe, ĐleaƌlǇ aŶ eaƌlǇ foƌeƌuŶŶeƌ of ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
human-machine system research.13,14  
GiǀeŶ Helŵholtz͛s pƌaĐtiĐal iŶteƌest iŶ ƌaŶge estiŵatioŶ, it is hardly surprising that his protégé 
Wundt continued his work on range estimation and human-machine system research. Indeed, the 
ŵajoƌitǇ of WuŶdt͛s eŵpiƌiĐal ƌeseaƌĐh ǁas iŶ ǀisual spaĐe peƌĐeptioŶ.15 Of what practical use is 
knowing where things are in space from visual cues alone?  Simply, you would have only needed to 
ask a naval gunner of the era. The emergence of academic psychology is no coincidence, but fit the 
ƌeǀolutioŶ iŶ teĐhŶologǇ of the tiŵe. IŶ effeĐt, psǇĐhologǇ ǁas the eƌa͛s atteŵpt at cognitive 
engineering.16 There have always been concerns regarding the ecological validity of psychological 
laboratory research and this is not new.5,17  
THE NEW COGNITIVE ENGINEERING 
This section details three frameworks within Cognitive Engineering that are often considered 
to ďe ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt oƌ ͚Ŷeǁeƌ͛ additioŶs. The fiƌst is CogŶitiǀe “Ǉsteŵs EŶgiŶeeƌiŶg ;C“EͿ, aŶ appƌoaĐh 
which emphasises the study of macro-cognition, or the cognition of skilled operators working in 
actual socio-technical systems. This is distinguished from the study of micro-cognition which often 
focuses on the sub-components of cognition of individuals͛. Macro-cognitive constructs are generally 
broad in nature (e.g., mental simulation, situational awareness) while micro-cognitive constructs are 
narrower in focus (e.g., sustained attention, working memory). As depicted in Figure 1, the 
distinction between macro- and micro-cognition is an ontological distinction, with micro-cognition 
focusing on the sub-components of cognition considered in isolation and macro-cognition examining 
the emergent properties that become evident when the human cognitive system is situated in a 
larger system made up of both other people (socio-) and tools (technical-). This distinction is unique, 
though correlated, with the choice of epistemological method, experimentation versus observation.  
While advocates of CSE may be found more often in quadrant B, performing observational research 
on macro-cognition, and cognitive psychologists in quadrant C, performing controlled laboratory 
studies of micro-cognition, research in quadrants A and D is important and should not be neglected.  
The second framework is Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), which also concerns macro-cognition. 
The third is Ecological Interface Design (EID) which focuses on the affordances which the work 
domain offers the human operator. All three share in common an approach that focuses heavily on 
the interplay of socio-technical systems. Some, however, consider NDM and EID to be frameworks 
within CSE itself. All focus more on fieldwork than laboratory work, perhaps, distinguishing the new 
CE from the more traditional approach to CE; researchers in the newer approaches of CSE and NDM 
tend to be found in quadrant B (but not exclusively).  
Klein et al.18 suggest that a focus on macro-cognition in CSE and NDM is beneficial, since it 
allows an assessment of human performance in context. Context is critical to understanding system 
performance. For example, if workers were denied access to the prosthetics they use to do their jobs 
in the actual work environment (for example, calculators or physical reminders for a task requiring 
memory, like post-it notes) their behaviour is unlikely to have relevance to understanding how the 
system works in practice. Macro-cognition also requires a different approach than the study of 
micro-cognition, although it might be argued that micro-cognition may benefit by being 
contextualized by macro-cognition studies. The overall perspective of these approaches is that 
studying the person in the actual working system is radically different from studying the person in 
isolation of the entire working system.19  
Cognitive Systems Engineering    
Defining Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE) is difficult since the term is sometimes used 
interchangeably with cognitive engineering. Militello, Dominguez, Lintern, & Klein (Ref 20, p.3) 
ĐoŶteŶd that ͞C“E is aŶ appƌoaĐh to the desigŶ of teĐhŶologǇ, tƌaiŶiŶg, aŶd pƌoĐesses iŶteŶded to 
manage cognitive complexity in socio-teĐhŶiĐal sǇsteŵs.͟ It is also referred to as joint cognitive 
systems. At a basic level, a socio-technical system describes the interaction between people and 
technology, bearing in mind that the term technology can refer to not only machinery but 
procedures and knowledge as well.21 Further, it is one in which humans provide essential 
functionality related to deciding, planning for, collaborating with, and managing the system. 
CSE originated around the time that human-machine interaction grew so complex that these 
two components, human and machine, were better viewed as a single all-encompassing system.22 By 
emphasising macro-cognitive processes over micro-cognitive processes, CSE attempts to explain the 
what and the why in terms of the joint cognitive system, in addition to the how.23 The core values 
and intentions of CSE include: (1) observation, where practitioners observe work being done to 
understand how workers do what they do and adapt within their environment; (2) abstraction, 
which involves retrieving information and patterns from the various situations and settings; and (3) 
discovery and innovation, whereby the information garnered from the first two processes is utilised 
to create improved concepts and procedures.24 In CSE, there is no standardised process or sequence 
of design. Rather, practitioners are constantly re-evaluating the design of the system as they 
proceed. Any changes that are made to any aspect of the socio-technical system will likely have 
carry-over effects on other aspects of the system and this creates an iterative loop. This iterative re-
evaluation is integral to the approach, and highlights the creative and opportunistic process of CSE.20  
An important advantage of CSE over alternative approaches is that, conceptually, it takes into 
account attributes of the particular environment of a system.25 This is often crucial, as the 
environment can have a significant bearing on the functionality of the system as well as the desired 
or required output. For instance, compare a large group of networked computers in a public library 
with a similar group in a police department. The police department and public library have radically 
different requirements, for example, regarding security of data and access. There is a concern, 
perhaps unwarranted, that CSE is a move away from rigorous systematic methods to one more 
emulative of haphazard tinkering. In the drive to examine and improve complete or intact work 
systems, there may be a tendency to overlook the merits of isolating system components and 
rigorously undertaking tests by controlling relevant variables (e.g., the experimental method).    
There are many examples of CSE improving socio-technical systems.26, 27 Recently, it was used 
to radically improve landmine detection rates from 5% to 95% within the U.S. Army. The first step 
here was to observe soldiers who were considered experts in detecting landmines, as demonstrated 
by their superior detection rates. Information processing analyses were performed to extract the 
knowledge and skills they were utilising during detections, and afterwards cognitive models were 
developed using this information. These models were employed subsequently to guide the design of 
new training programs.28 A similar approach was used to develop weather-related training initiatives 
for pilots. Cognitive interviews were conducted with expert general aviation pilots and cues were 
identified that could be associated with deteriorating weather conditions. These cues were 
incorporated into a computer-based training package, the introduction of which was associated with 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ pilots͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to deteĐt deteƌioƌatiŶg ǁeatheƌ ĐoŶditioŶs duƌiŶg siŵulated 
flight.29  
 There are also numerous cases where designers have failed to include CSE in the design 
process, leading to poor results. A well-known Los Angeles medical centre was forced to withdraw 
highly-anticipated new computer software following user complaints,30 and a $170 million FBI 
computer system suffered a similar fate following a lack of CSE during design and implementation. In 
the case of the FBI computer system, failures arose because it did not offer the agents many of the 
functions they required. This was said to be because the agency failed to define their operational 
processes beforehand, leaving the software developers to do this instead.31 Despite the 
opportunities afforded by CSE in improving human performance, it faces some challenges in 
becoming better accepted by the design and engineering communities. One barrier is the complex 
terminology used by CSE practitioners, and the fact that there is often more than one term used to 
describe the same construct. This makes it difficult for practitioners outside the CSE field to 
understand the role of cognitive engineering.20 Secondly, it has yet to outwardly establish itself to 
other members of design disciplines.  Often, CSE advocates confront difficulties in quantifying gains 
precipitated by the CSE approach. If both the methods and the terminology of CSE can evolve into 
forms which are more comprehensible for people in neighbouring disciplines such as engineering, 
these disciplines may gradually begin to incorporate the use of CSE during the design process.20  
Naturalistic Decision Making  
NatuƌalistiĐ deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg ;NDMͿ ĐaŶ ďe defiŶed as ͞hoǁ people ŵake deĐisioŶs in real-
world settiŶgs,͟ ;‘ef ϯϮ, p.456). This is one of the similarities that NDM shares with CSE, since it 
focuses on macro-cognition, rather than micro-cognition. As its name implies, NDM was originally 
based around decision making in naturalistic contexts. In the past decade, however, it has evolved to 
include a focus on cognitive constructs within these contexts, also known as macro-cognition.33 
Considerable evidence exists to indicate that decision-making within ideal conditions is not always 
representative of the decision-making strategies that are engaged in practice.34  This is unsurprising 
since both utility theory and behavioural decision theory propose that decisions, optimally, should 
be made in a step-by-step manner, with alternative actions and potential outcomes compared via a 
deliberate and calculated approach. This is time-consuming and, in natural settings, decision makers 
are forced to take cognitive short-cuts or use heuristics.  
NDM advocates assert that decision making strategies that are engaged in field settings are 
often distinct from the strategies that are evident in isolated or in relatively impoverished laboratory 
environments. While traditional research describes optimal decision making with normative models 
such as utility theory, other models such as the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model are thought 
by NDM advocates to better express how decisions are made in naturalistic settings.  
The RPD model emerged from work by Klein and associates,35 who undertook cognitive task 
analyses with fire fighters. They noted that the fire fighters were not engaging decision strategies 
consistent with traditional models, such as behavioural decision theory and utility theory. This was 
especially the case in situations that were time-pressured and/or that embodied uncertain or ill-
defined goals.36 It is difficult to imagine a fire fighter pausing amid putting out a burning house with 
people trapped inside, to carefully sort through and compare options mentally. While this may 
increase the likelihood that the fire fighter will select the optimal response (although it may not), it 
will definitely consume a large portion of time and cognitive resources. When making decisions in 
the field, experts in particular, use pattern recognition techniques to match a situation with 
potential responses to that situation. For example, on glancing at the burning house and seeing a 
particular type or colour of smoke, the expert fire fighter can rapidly identify the type of combustion 
and its implications in responding to the fire. This could be a result of matching the features of the 
event being experienced to a previous event involving a similar-style house. This approach often 
yields a much shorter decision making duration, and frequently, the first option considered is the 
͚ƌight͛ optioŶ uŶdeƌ the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes.37 Studies of chess players several decades ago showed that 
the performance of expert players was barely affected by a considerable shortening of the time 
permitted to make moves, while the performance of non-experts suffered markedly. Furthermore, 
the very first options considered by experienced players at each move were much more likely to be 
considered adequate than the first options considered by non-experts.38 The early studies by Klein 
and colleagues also established that experts were using a tactic – which had been identified over 
thirty years previously – referred to as satisficing.39 This describes the act of choosing the first 
feasible option that comes to mind (satisficing), rather than searching for the optimal option 
;optiŵiziŶgͿ. WheŶ ĐoŶteŵplatiŶg aŶ optioŶ, eǆpeƌts ǁould ofteŶ ͚plaǇ it out͛ as a ŵeŶtal siŵulatioŶ 
to get a better sense of the suitability of the decision. If it was considered inappropriate, they would 
make slight alterations or consider an alteƌŶatiǀe optioŶ. If it ͚plaǇed out͛ suĐĐessfullǇ, the optioŶ 
would be implemented.32  
NDM has made some important contributions to understanding how experts operate in 
naturalistic settings by addressing a number of areas previously neglected in psychological research 
and by introducing new models and methods of psychological inquiry. It is also responsible for 
attracting applied investigators into the field of Cognitive Engineering. NDM has attractive appeal 
given the focus on high-profile individuals (experts) in actual work environments. One challenge, 
however, is that the proponents of NDM frequently highlight the applied nature of their 
methodologies. For example, Endsley et al. (Ref 25, p. ϯͿ ƌelates that ͞NDM speĐifiĐallǇ seeks to 
provide rich descriptioŶs of hoǁ people ŵake deĐisioŶs iŶ the ƌeal ǁoƌld…͟ The eŵphasis oŶ ͚ƌeal-
ǁoƌld͛ aŶd ͚ƌeal-life͛ settiŶgs is a ƌeĐuƌƌiŶg theŵe ǁithiŶ the NDM liteƌatuƌe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, as ‘ogeƌs40 
suggests, these terms carry little meaning and may allow authors to avoid being specific or avoid 
developing theoretical perspectives that can be generalised and tested (see also Ref 41). Of course, 
rich description is terminology borrowed from ethnology and other disciplines using sophisticated 
qualitative methodologies. Aside from the issue of qualitative methods putting NDM at odds with 
those advocating quantitative methods for Cognitive Engineering, it may overlook the long tradition 
of cultural analysis and qualitative methods used in psychology which can trace its origins to the 
emergence of the discipline. Regardless, NDM should be applauded for its contribution to the field 
by more forcefully advocating rigorous qualitative data analysis, a tool that has been somewhat 
neglected by psychologists and thus, by researchers in human factors.   
Ecological Interface Design   
Ecological interface design (EID) differs from CSE and NDM insofar as it places particular 
emphasis not on the task within the work domain but on the affordances which the work domain 
itself offers the operator.25 It bears a close resemblance to cognitive work analysis. An ecological 
approach within human factors or applied psychology is not new and could historically be traced 
from James Gibson back via Edward Tolman, Edwin Holt and Hugo Munsterberg to William James 
aŶd Wilheŵ WuŶdt. Hoǁeǀeƌ, EID has a ŵoƌe Ŷaƌƌoǁ sĐope aŶd foĐuses ͞oŶ the speĐifiĐ pƌoďleŵ of 
how to design human-computer interfaces for complex socio-teĐhŶiĐal sǇsteŵs͟ ;‘ef ϰϮ, p. 63). 
 The main aim of ecological interface design (EID) is to devise systems that support operator 
adaptation. It is not possible for designers to anticipate every single situation that may arise, and 
therefore, there is always a possibility that unexpected, non-routine events can take place.43,44 
Unanticipated events such as these range from the mundane and frequently occurring, to the 
extremely rare and catastrophic. The latter often take operators by surprise and the subsequent 
outcomes can be devastating.45 Through the appropriate application of EID techniques in the design 
process, operators should be able to cope better when faced with these events. The approach is 
based on the principles that attempting to completely eliminate errors is futile, but instead, efforts 
should be directed towards their control and management. The primary focus here is on errors of 
͚iŶteŶtioŶ,͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe distiŶguishaďle fƌoŵ eƌƌoƌs of ͚eǆeĐutioŶ.͛ The former can be conceptualised 
as mistakes while the latter can be thought of as slips. Unanticipated events are plagued by mistakes 
more so than slips, while the opposite is true for routine events. While other methodologies within 
Cognitive Engineering can be employed to help prevent slips, EID, according to its proponents, is the 
method most able to effectively reduce mistakes.44 Often, these types of errors, although rare, can 
lead to the most severe outcomes.46 EID is designed to provide the operator with the greatest 
likelihood of successfully negotiating these types of errors when they occur, by facilitating 
adaptation.42 It is thought that the partial meltdown of a nuclear power plant in the United States, 
known as the Three Mile Island disaster, would have been avoided had elements of EID been 
incorporated into the control room design. After the occurrence of an unexpected sequence of 
events, insufficient warning information displayed on the control room interface led to operators 
making mistakes which in turn led to the subsequent catastrophe.47  
Two key aspects of EID are 1) abstraction hierarchies, and 2) the skills, rules, and knowledge 
taxonomy. An abstraction hierarchy is used to describe constraints within an environment in such a 
way that it aids potential coping methods.44 Information in an abstraction hierarchy can be divided 
into lower level or higher level information, with the former describing physical information and the 
latter describing functional information. Complementing this is the use of the skills, rules, and 
knowledge taxonomy to elucidate the cognitive processes involved in decision making in these 
settings. Skill-based behaviour concerns direct behavioural interaction with the environment. Rule-
based behaviour concerns perceptual information and cues. Knowledge-based behaviour involves 
more deliberate problem solving behaviour, and demands more effort than either skill-based or rule-
based behaviour.42  
There are examples of the implementation of EID leading to improved performance over 
previously state-of-the-art methods in socio-technical systems.48,49 These improvements tend to be 
limited to tasks of a more complex nature, although there are no losses in performance following its 
application to simpler tasks too.44 As to the impetus of these gains, there are several likely 
contributions. These include the presentation of information in forms (usually visual) that enable the 
categorisation of information, the anticipation of changes that are likely to occur, and the 
consequences of intended actions.    
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the positive effects generated by EID do not occur with all 
people as evident in individual differences.44 Furthermore, the vast majority of the EID work appears 
to be contained to visual aspects of design, as related by Watson & Sanderson,50 who emphasise 
that EID can be useful when involving modalities other than just visual perception. Another issue is 
the amount (or lack) of empirical validation of the success stories. There is, however, some research 
demonstrating that EID has led to improved visual performance in a simulation of a power plant.51,52  
TRADITIONAL COGNITIVE ENGINEERING 
 This section comprises three research topics within Cognitive Engineering which might be 
considered to represent the more traditional approach to cognitive engineering.53 The three topics 
are vigilance, skill learning/expertise, and visual displays and iconic cues. These topics make 
extensive use of what new cognitive engineering advocates would call micro-cognition and 
experimentation, especially in controlled laboratory settings (in Figure 1, quadrant C). These 
approaches are micro-cognitive in orientation because researchers in these traditions do appear to 
take a reductive orientation and attempt to isolate cognitive sub-components. Our hope in 
highlighting these topics is to demonstrate the complementary nature of laboratory research or 
traditional human factors with the concerns and techniques being developed by the new Cognitive 
Engineering. Both approaches can be integrated effectively and the field, to be effective, needs to 
cover all quadrants in Figure 1. At the very least, the examples highlight the continued relevance of 
tightly controlled laboratory study to Cognitive Engineering.  
Vigilance  
 Increasingly, modern work environments are dependent upon automated systems. This is 
especially the case in critical infrastructure or industries requiring high reliability, including industrial 
manufacturing, utility system management, aviation, ground transportation, defence systems, and 
medicine. Automation has developed rapidly in response to the demands of higher labour costs and 
the desire for improved precision.54  Nevertheless, automated systems remain dependent upon 
human operators to monitor the integrity of the system and intervene when necessary to either 
prevent a system failure or to ensure that the system is operating optimally.55,56 The need for 
operator intervention is unpredictable in both its frequency and its intensity in automated systems, 
thereby relegating the operator to the role of a passive observer.57,58  
 The difficulty with this role is the need to maintain sufficient attention to the task, despite a 
relatively passive role for the human monitor. This monitoring for rarely occurring system changes is 
labelled vigilance. Systematic research on vigilance began with the work of Norman Mackworth,59,60 
who was requested to work on a practical problem encountered by the Royal Air Force (United 
Kingdom) during the Second World War. At the time, pulse-position radio detection and ranging – 
radar – was a new technological innovation employed to discover the presence of surfaced Axis 
submarines. The diesel submarines of the era would have to surface to recharge their batteries. 
When they surfaced they would create a radar signature that could be detected by an airborne-
based system. Undoubtedly, airborne radar reconnaissance was an improvement over earlier 
techniques employed to detect U-boats, such as training sea gulls to flock around them.61 However, 
the system had a serious problem. Regardless of their high level of motivation and extensive 
tƌaiŶiŶg, the aiƌďoƌŶe oďseƌǀeƌs ďegaŶ to ŵiss ͚ďlips͛ oŶ theiƌ ƌadaƌ sĐopes iŶdiĐatiŶg the pƌeseŶĐe of 
submarines after only 30 min of watch. Losses in vigilance, if left unchecked, could result in 
iŶĐƌeasiŶg losses of Allied ǀessels to suďŵaƌiŶe attaĐks. Fƌoŵ MaĐkǁoƌth͛s eaƌlǇ ƌeseaƌĐh oŶǁaƌds, 
the primary interest of vigilance researchers has been the decline in performance over time-on-task, 
or the vigilance decrement. The vigilance decrement is marked by either a decline in signal 
detections with time-on-task or an increase in response latencies with time-on-task.  
The intriguing aspect of the vigilance decrement is that the loss of performance occurs even 
though critical signals are perceptible when observers are forewarned about them (e.g., it is not that 
the targets are impossible to detect in an alerted state). Vigilance tasks require the detection of 
perceptible changes that are not compelling changes in the operating environment. These target or 
critical stimuli appear unpredictably with a relatively low probability of occurrence and the observer 
has no control over when they appear.62,63,64,65,66,67,68  The long history of studies conducted since 
MaĐkǁoƌth͛s seŵiŶal iŶǀestigatioŶs pƌoǀide a ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶg Đase that the ĐeŶtƌal Ŷeƌǀous sǇsteŵ, 
regardless of species (the exception may be dolphins, see Helton et al.69 for discussion), cannot 
sustain attention for an indefinite period of time and thus, that the focus of attention is temporally 
limited. Dukas and Clark70 propose that the vigilance decrement is a dominant factor determining 
animal behaviour, including human operator behaviour. The decrement can result in failures to 
respond accurately to a change in the system state or a failure to respond in sufficient time to 
prevent a system failure.71 The use of automated systems in a broader context can result in other 
concerns as well, including a loss of skills, a lack of work identity, increases in stress and fatigue, and 
in some cases, violations of standard operating procedures.72  
 Researchers of vigilance examine the underlying factors influencing the decrement. An 
understanding of these relevant factors may help system designers develop better systems to 
maintain operator vigilance. If this, however, remains elusive, cognitive engineers have also 
examined whether there are indicators of the operator being in an unvigilant state. These indicators 
ĐaŶ theŶ ďe used to ͚ŵoŶitoƌ the ŵoŶitoƌ͛, iŶ aŶ appƌoaĐh Đalled augŵeŶted ĐogŶitioŶ.  AugŵeŶted 
Cognition is a recently developed field of research seeking to extend the information processing 
capacities of human operators by using real-time assessments of human cognitive states and 
employing these real-time assessments as inputs in the technological system.73 The human 
opeƌatoƌ͛s ĐogŶitiǀe state ĐaŶ ďe assessed ǁith a ǀaƌietǇ of seŶsoƌ teĐhŶologies deteĐting 
behavioural, psychophysiological and neurophysiological data acquired from the operator in real 
time. These data can then be used to adapt or augment the technological interface to significantly 
improve human performance. Augmented Cognition techniques may enable organisations to predict 
or detect when operators will be likely to miss target stimuli. Detecting these operator changes may 
lead to a dramatic reduction in accidents-mishaps, by both increasing awareness as to when these 
errors are more likely to occur, and perhaps, in the future by altering the system itself.  
Peripheral and central physiological markers can also be used to gauge the amount of 
cognitive resources that a human operator is expending. For example, pupil diameter when 
controlling for lighting may be a marker of cognitive resource expenditure.74,75 Self-reported task 
engagement has also been found to be negatively correlated with blink rate while self-reported 
distress is positively correlated with heart rate.76,77 Several studies have shown that there is a close 
relation between mental activity and cerebral blood flow.78,79 Recent signal detection studies80,81,82 
indicate that the temporal decline in target detections that typifies vigilance performance, the 
vigilance decrement, is accompanied by a parallel decline in cerebral blood flow. They also indicate 
that the absolute level of cerebral blood flow in vigilance tasks is positively related to the 
psychophysical and cognitive demands placed upon observers and that these effects are lateralized 
to the right cerebral hemisphere.80,82,83  
 The future of vigilance research will take a neuro-ergonomic perspective in an attempt to 
prevent vigilance decrement via system intervention when the human operator is in an unvigilant 
state. Cognitive Engineering will see the benefits of neuroscience by absorbing both the findings and 
techniques coming from the neurosciences. These cognitive-neuro systems will revolutionize the 
way people interact with machines. If integrated with the newer perspective of CSE, it suggests that 
the introduction of physiological monitoring systems will themselves come to be used by operators 
to improve system performance. This will itself require further investigation.   
Skill Learning and Expertise 
Researchers propose a developmental transition in skill from active control to 
automaticity.84,85,86,87 The automatization of skill frees up attention for other concurrent tasks and 
operations. Changes in attention during skill development are well established.86,87 Fitts͛ and 
PosŶeƌ͛s88 aŶd AŶdeƌsoŶs͛s89 stage models of expertise development are cases in point. In these 
models, the initial cognitive-stage, requiring active control, consists of close attention to cues and 
feedback. Performance during the cognitive-stage is not fluid and requires the coordination of the 
separate skill elements by the individual. Skill production during this stage is attention demanding 
and places limits on performing other activities. The next associative-stage in the model consists of 
organizing these separate skill elements into larger units or chunks by chaining operations and 
procedures together. This organization results in an increase in production fluidity-speed and a 
decrease in attention requirements. The final autonomous-stage consists of the skill becoming 
relatively independent from active cognitive control and attention, or in other words, automatic. 
This enables an even greater freeing up of attention.   
A common example is driving an automobile. A well-trained driver is usually able to drive 
(primary task) while simultaneously engaging in a conversation with a passenger (secondary task). 
When driving conditions, however, become more difficult, such as during dense, unpredictable 
traffic, or on slippery roads, the conversation needs to stop since the attention resources needed to 
undertake both tasks simultaneously is limited. These attention resources represent anything of 
limited supply in the control system of the individual: glucose-oxygen, neurotransmitters, neurons, 
or actual neuronal groups. The skill level of the operator also determines this attention trade-off 
between the primary task of driving and the secondary task of carrying on a conversation. A novice 
will need to stop talking even sooner than an expert.   
A skill performed without attention costs is considered to be automatic.86 Automaticity is itself 
gradated so that tasks require more or less attention resources. Some researchers argue that all 
tasks have some attention costs, although they can be small, to the point that it is difficult to 
determine the attention cost with current methods90 (see Ref 91 for an alternative perspective). 
Nevertheless, there is significant evidence to suggest that skills become more automated and less 
attention demanding with practice.92   Skill execution in the early stage of learning requires the 
executive attention system to actively integrate sub-components of the skill and coordinate their 
production.87 The attention demands of skill production are less intense with practice, because the 
sub-routines have been stored in larger memory units or chunks93 and the brain has reorganized to 
be more efficient.94,95  
Implicit learning studies have shown that contextual regularities that affect performance can 
be acquired independent of conscious awareness.96 In these implicit learning studies the human 
participant must actively attend to the display for the sequences to be learned.97 Participants may be 
unaware of having learned a particular sequence, they are, however, certainly aware of the original 
perceptual inputs. They are not learning subliminally. There is research showing that later visual 
performance can be influenced by prior exposure to subliminal stimuli.98  However, in these 
subliminal perceptual learning experiments, the learning only occurs when the subliminal 
information is presented concurrently with actively attended to stimuli. Apparently, mere exposure 
is not sufficient to initiate learning.99 The learning of complex skills, at least, appears to require 
attention or the investment of attention. Especially in the novice stage, performance can be 
disrupted by other tasks placing demands on attention. Later, as the skill becomes more automatic, 
attention can be redirected to other objects or tasks. Although it is certainly possible that learning 
can occur without any input from executive attention, there is very little evidence to support this 
contention, especially in the acquisition of complex skills. Understanding the role of attention in skill 
learning can result in improvements in instructional design or training systems, for example, 
Cognitive Load Theory.100 This perspective is also informative for making adaptive user interfaces 
that ĐaŶ sĐale to the iŶdiǀidual͛s skill leǀel, e.g. the sǇsteŵ Đould sĐale to a ŶoǀiĐe aŶd pƌoǀide more 
attention support.  
One challenge for research involving the acquisition of complex skills is determining who is 
actually highly skilled, or expert, at the task (this is also a problem for NDM). While one could rely on 
professional reputation, often this can be due to seniority or presentation ability, and not actual 
level of skill. This is where using the laboratory methods developed by skill researchers has 
additional merits over merely observing individuals in the field (e.g., doing work ethnology). If the 
skill is not obvious without objective standards of the level of ability, techniques developed in the 
laboratory can be employed to reveal relative skill level. Many occupational skills are not like track-
and-field events with objective performance metrics (time or distance) that are obvious to all. 
Instead, complex skills require integrative diagnosis. The later is difficult to establish. Researchers 
have developed methods, however, to resolve this challenge. EXPERTise, for example, is a 
psychometric tool that is designed to distinguish expert from competent and novice 
practitioners.101,102 EXPERTise is specifically designed to assess diagnostic expertise when using 
human-machine interfaces. Performance is assessed on a series of five tasks, each of which 
incorporates domain-relevant stimuli (derived from cognitive interviews of subject-matter experts) 
aŶd Đapitalises oŶ opeƌatoƌs͛ ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ Đue utilisatioŶ. The utilitǇ of EXPE‘Tise lies iŶ its use of 
norms in preference to assessments of performance against a standard. Recent analyses have 
yielded a test-retest reliability of 0.79 and 0.78 at six monthly intervals.103 In relation to predictive 
validity, statistically significant relationships have been established between performance-based 
classifications on EXPERTise, and accuracy on high fidelity diagnostic assessment tasks in the context 
of power controllers104 and paediatricians.105  
 
 
Displays and Iconic Cues 
  Although Human Factors has a long history of research into the appropriate display of 
information,106 current work in the area integrates findings from laboratory studies with more 
naturalistic examinations of skilled operators (similar to NDM). In modern automated work systems, 
operators will often be relatively disengaged from the system when a system alert is issued (see also 
the section on vigilance above). From an information processing perspective, disengagement from a 
primary task inevitably results in a situation where the acquisition, integration, and interpretation of 
information associated with a change in the system state must be completed within a shorter period 
of time than might be the case if the operator was fully engaged in system operation. Where 
primary, task-related information is sampled on a continuous basis and an existing schema or mental 
model is updated, the information can be prioritized so that a relatively limited number of key 
indicators or cues are retained, thereby reducing the demands on working memory.102 However, 
where a system-related problem occurs in the absence of regular sampling, the process of 
information acquisition is necessarily broad initially in an attempt to identify the patterns of cues 
that are evident, and thereby develop an accurate diagnosis.107  
For more experienced operators, the process of information acquisition will quickly become 
more refined to a point where the pattern is recognised and the diagnosis is resolved. Researchers, 
for example, conducted a series of experiments in which they were able to identify the key features 
that competent pilots engage during a partial engine failure in a simulated aircraft.108 However, for 
less experienced operators, the process of information acquisition is considerably less structured 
and requires a level of time and resources beyond that required by experts.109  The difficulty for the 
less experienced operator lies in an inability to quickly recognise and integrate cues to quickly draw 
meaning from a situation. Helton and colleagues110 have shown that the workload imposed by these 
demands is a significant source of distress for operators that further impacts operator 
performance.111,112 To cope with these demands, the process of information acquisition tends to 
involve the search for specific information that will point towards a specific cause, and might thus 
explain the change in the system state. Overall, it is a process that is time and resource intensive, 
emotionally distressing, and is subject to error.113  
  Iconic cues are tools, however, that have the capacity to highlight a change in the system 
state, direct the attention of the operator to key features that will enable a more rapid and a more 
accurate diagnosis and response to the change in the system state. Cues represent feature-event 
relationships in memory and they are used to interpret situations rapidly and with relatively little 
demand on working memory resources.17,107 At a fundamental level, there are particular features 
that hold some meaning to the operator by virtue of their association with specific events in memory 
and it is this association that provides the basis for the cue. Where a feature-event relation becomes 
more familiar, exposure to even a relatively limited portrayal of this feature can trigger a non-
conscious association in memory.  
 The application of visual cues is evident in a wide range of environments, including weather 
decision-making by pilots,29 the interpretation of murder scenes by forensic investigators,114 the 
identification of an appropriate point of entry to a building by fire fighters,115 and the management 
of convulsions in an infant by paediatricians.116 In each case, expert practitioners engage a relatively 
limited number of specific features to interpret a situation. However, the cues can be taught to 
competent practitioners with resultant improvements in performance.117  
The use of icons as cues is common in a range of industrial environments, including aviation 
and medicine.115 For example, in the medical context physicians will draw conclusions on the basis of 
visual representations of heart rate. Similarly, in aviation, icons are used to display the trajectory of 
the aircraft along an optimal descent path. In both cases, responses are expected if the icons depict 
a deviation from the normal limits. Given the importance of cues for system diagnosis, display 
designers can create better displays which enhance the recognition of icons. For example, 
highlighting features or increasing their salience in the display. The techniques used to enhance icon 
recognition would employ all the results of laboratory studies looking at visual search. This approach 
integrates the work of traditional psychology or Human Factors laboratories with the newer 
approach of NDM and suggests a bridge between the two Cognitive Engineering camps.  
CONCLUSION 
 This review of both the new and traditional approaches to Cognitive Engineering was 
intended to highlight their complementary nature. Advocates of the new approaches are correct to 
point out that any over-emphasis on micro-cognition without research of macro-cognition can be 
harmful to cognitive engineering. Context is important. Neglecting research of micro-cognition is, 
however, potentially self-defeating. For example, some engineers, including cognitive engineers, 
might suggest that the issue of vigilance can be designed out of the system or does not occur in 
operational settings (despite numerous studies showing otherwise, see Ref 118). For example, 
colleagues in a North American defence laboratory recently indicated concerns to one of the authors 
that some members of a policy advisory board had indicated that vigilance was no longer a serious 
concern in unmanned systems. This view, however, directly contradicts the findings of a recent 
review of human factors issues in unmanned operations conducted by Defence Research and 
Development Canada. Arrabito et al. (Ref 119, p.3) state that "In contrast, for UVs [unmanned 
vehicles] that are highly automated (e.g., automated take-off and landing, and pre-programmed 
flight), the human factors issues are primarily related to problems in operator supervisory control 
such as maintaining vigilance." Future uninhabited vehicles will be highly automated, and reviews by 
allied defence forces conclude that maintaining operator vigilance is the critical issue in future 
uninhabited vehicle operations. While innovations in designs can result in improvements in overall 
system performance, the problem of maintaining human operator vigilance is not going to subside. 
Complete automation without human supervision is fantasy. Design will, furthermore, not mitigate 
the effects of losses of human vigilance. In reality, increases in system automation will likely 
exacerbate the issue.64 This concern is also echoed in other industries where increasing automation 
has changed the nature of human work from active participation to system monitoring.118 Research 
on vigilance has a relatively long history, but this does not merit dismissing its relevance. Well 
conducted micro-cognitive research (in Figure 1, quadrant C) is more likely to lead to successful 
counter-measures in this case.  
Another issue which may be resolved is the metaphorical distance between laboratory and 
natural settings, which is often confused with the epistemological method distinction noted in Figure 
1. Zsambok & Klein120 list eight key contextual factors which constitute NDM situations, including a 
ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts to ďe ͞uŶĐeƌtaiŶ aŶd dǇŶaŵiĐ ;Ŷot statiĐ, siŵulated eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtsͿ͟ 
(Zsambok & Klein, Ref 120, p.5). Many simulated environments, however, can be recognised as both 
uŶĐeƌtaiŶ aŶd dǇŶaŵiĐ. IŶdeed, the sepaƌatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ a siŵulated aŶd ͚ƌeal͛ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt ǁill 
erode increasingly. As work becomes more like a simulation (for example, uninhabited vehicle 
operations) and simulations become more like work, eventually the laboratory and the real world 
ǁill iŶtegƌate. The distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ͚ƌeal͛ ǁoƌld aŶd the laďoƌatoƌǇ ŵaǇ ďe a ďit oǀeƌplaǇed. 
Research in both environments is likely to be complementary.  
The new and traditional conceptualizations of cognitive engineering should merge, since both 
provide important contributions to the overall field. While one of the beliefs of a free market is that 
competition results in better products, we have to wonder how much energy is being wasted on 
marketing the various brands of Cognitive Engineering and whether this could, in the long run, be 
damaging Cognitive Engineering as a discipline. The field, for example, does not need to constantly 
add esoteric terminology. Otherwise, Cognitive Engineering will become as hard to comprehend as a 
post-modern novel. Advocates of the new approaches need to recognize that while they are offering 
some new ideas, they are actually not necessarily a radical break with traditional human factors or 
applied psychology. Many engineers are sceptical of psychology however it is repackaged. Instead of 
fixating on terminology and branding, the key may be to focus on results. For example, how many 
iŶtƌoduĐtoƌǇ psǇĐhologǇ teǆtďooks iŶĐlude seĐtioŶs oŶ Fitts͛ Laǁ,121 Hicks Law, Stimulus-Response 
compatibility, etc.? All are substantial and significant contributions of psychology to real world 
human-machine interfaces. For that matter, even psychophysics is slowly being edged out of the 
introductory courses to the field, despite being the origin of the field and still immensely useful. 
Perhaps, the lack of consistency and recognition of success is hampering the field of psychology and 
its sub-fields like Cognitive Engineering. Essentially, psychology has always been Cognitive 
Engineering.5  
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